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Abstract
The new paradigm of wirelessly powered two-tier heterogeneous networks (HetNets) is considered
in this paper. Specifically, the femtocell base station (FBS) is powered by a power beacon (PB) and
transmits confidential information to a legitimate femtocell user (FU) in the presence of a potential
eavesdropper (EVE) and a macro base station (MBS). In this scenario, we investigate the secrecy
beamforming design under three different levels of FBS-EVE channel state information (CSI), namely,
the perfect, imperfect and completely unknown FBS-EVE CSI. Firstly, given the perfect global CSI at
the FBS, the PB energy covariance matrix, the FBS information covariance matrix and the time splitting
factor are jointly optimized aiming for perfect secrecy rate maximization. Upon assuming the imperfect
FBS-EVE CSI, the worst-case and outage-constrained SRM problems corresponding to deterministic
and statistical CSI errors are investigated, respectively. Furthermore, considering the more realistic case
of unknown FBS-EVE CSI , the artificial noise (AN) aided secrecy beamforming design is studied.
Our analysis reveals that for all above cases both the optimal PB energy and FBS information secrecy
beamformings are of rank-1. Moreover, for all considered cases of FBS-EVE CSI, the closed-form
PB energy beamforming solutions are available when the cross-tier interference constraint is inactive.
Numerical simulation results demonstrate the secrecy performance advantages of all proposed secrecy
beamforming designs compared to the adopted baseline algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of smart devices and data-hungry applications, establishing ubiquitous,
high-throughput and secure communications is gaining increased importance in next-generation
systems [1]–[3]. The traditional macrocells generally have poor performance in terms of indoor
coverage and cell edge rate. To tackle this issue, heterogenous networks (HetNets) have emerged
as a promising next-generation architecture, which are generally supported by heterogenous base
stations (BSs) having different service coverages [4], [5]. Specifically, the macrocell base station
(MBS) can provide open access and wide coverage up to dozens of kilometers, while the low-
power femtocell base station (FBS) and picocell base station (PBS) are typically deployed in
2indoor environments and near to femtocell users (FUs) and picocell users (PUs), respectively.
As pointed out in [6], the ultra-dense deployment of femtocells is recognized as an effecient
technique to realize 1000 times increase in wireless data rate for. However, due to the high spatial
spectrum reuse in HetNets and the dense deployment of FBSs and PBSs, cross-tier interference
is usually unavoidable in HetNets. Fortunately, according to [7], [8], the interference can be
re-utilized as an effective radio-frequency (RF) energy source for wireless energy harvesting
(WEH), which thus contributes to the green and self-sustainable communications. WEH has
many advantages over conventional energy supply methods [9]. For example, WEH is more
reliable than natural energy supply, such as solar, wind and tide, which are significantly affected
by climate and terrain. Also, it is more cost-effective compared to the widely adopted batteries
recharge/replacement technique. Generally, the densely deployed HetNets are favorable from
the perspective of improving efficiency of WEH, since the distances from energy harvesters to
energy stations are substantially shortened.
Recently, WEH-based HetNets have received extension attention, in which the power beacons
(PBs) provide power for other nodes via wireless energy transfer [10]–[16]. In [10], H. Tabassum
and E. Hossain studied the optimal deployment of PBs in wirelessly powered cellular networks.
In [11], the downlink resource allocation problem was investigated by S. Lohani et al. under both
time-switching and power-splitting based simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT) strategies for two-tier HetNets. The comprehensive analysis of the outage probability
and the average ergodic rate in both downlink and uplink stages of wirelessly powered HetNets
with different cell associations were presented by S. Akbar et al. in [12]. Y. Zhu et al. in
[13] further extended the above work into the Massive MIMO aided HetNets with WEH, where
different user association schemes are investigated in terms of the achievable average uplink rate.
From the view of green communications, the energy efficient beamforming designs for SWIPT
HetNets was studied by M. Sheng et al. and H. Zhang et al. in [14] and [15], respectively. To
increase energy harvesting efficiency multi-antenna PBs and users, J. Kim et al. in [16] considered
sum throughput maximization under different cooperative protocols of two-tier wireless powered
cognitive networks.
Furthermore, owing to the open network architectures of HetNets, the security issue faced
by wireless powered HetNets has also drawn extensive attention [17]. As a mature technique
to guarantee secure communications from the information-theoretical perspective, physical-layer
security (PLS) has been widely researched in both academia and industry [18], [19]. There have
3been some works considering applying PLS techniques to HetNets with WEH. In [20] and [21],
the artificial noise based secrecy rate maximization was studied for secure HetNets with SWIPT.
The authors in [22] proposed the max-min secrecy energy efficiency optimization for wireless
powered HetNets, and a distributed ADMM approach was applied to reduce the information
exchange overhead. Considering the more practical scenarios where the transmitter only has
imperfect eavesdropper’s CSI, a secrecy SWIPT strategy for two-tier cognitive radio networks
was investigated in [23].
Most of the existing works on HetNets with WEH focus on SWIPT HetNets, it is still an open
challenging issue on how to design the optimal harvest-then-transmit strategies for HetNets. In
this paper, we investigate the secrecy beamforming design for a wirelessly powered HetNet,
where the wirelessly powered FBS transmits the confidential information to a single-antenna
FU in the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper (Eve). The FBS can harvest energy from
the PB and the MBS. Moreover, there is no cooperation among the MBS, the PB and the
FBS, thus the resultant cross-tier interference is taken into account. In this wirelessly powered
HetNet, the energy and information covariance matrices as well as the time splitting factor are
jointly optimized to maximize the secrecy rate under different levels of FBS-EVE CSI. Our main
contribution is summarized as :
• Firstly, we study secrecy rate maximization (SRM) of the wirelessly powered HetNet having
perfect global CSI. In order to address this non-convex perfect SRM problem, a relaxed
problem using the matrix trace inequality is studied and proved to be tight, since it always
provides a rank-1 optimal solution. Considering the joint-convexity and quasi-convexity of
the relaxed problem on different variables, a convexity-based linear search is proposed for
optimally solving the perfect SRM problem. In particular, the closed-form solution of this
problem is derived when the cross-tier interference at the MU is negligible.
• Secondly, the imperfect FBS-EVE CSI with deterministic and Gaussian random CSI errors
are considered, respectively. For the deterministic CSI error, the worst-case SRM problem is
studied, which can be addressed similarly to the perfect SRM problem using the S-procedure.
For the Gaussian random CSI error, the outage-constrained SRM problem subject to the
probabilistic secrecy rate constraint is studied by applying the Bernstein-type inequality
(BTI) [24] and then an alternating optimization procedure is proposed. For both the worst-
case and the outage-constrained SRM problems, the rank-1 property of the optimal solutions
is also validated.
4• Finally, we consider the realistic scenario with unknown FBS-EVE CSI, in which artificial
noise (AN) is utilized for improving secrecy performance. We design AN aided secrecy
beamforming by maximizing the average AN power subject to the legitimate rate require-
ment at the FU. This robust design can be reformulated as a concave one and its optimal
rank-1 solution is demonstrated. Similarly, for the inactive cross-interference constraint, the
closed-form solution to this AN aided secrecy beamforming design is available.
In fact, the studied SRM problems belong to the nonconvex difference of convex functions
(DC) programming, which are more challenging than that in [16] focusing on the sum-throughput
maximization of cognitive WPCNs. Compared to the SRM problem of [25] where the single-
antenna PB and Eve are assumed, these SRM problems are also more intractable due to the
additional energy and interference constraints. Fortunately, we validate that the optimal energy
and information beamformings are of rank-1 in the secrecy wirelessly powered HetNet, regardless
of the availability of eavesdropper’s CSI. This conclusion also provides important insights for
practical engineering applications.
Notations: The bold-faced lower-case and upper-case letters stand for vectors and matrices,
respectively. The operators (·)T, (·)H and (·)−1 denote the transpose, Hermitian and inverse of a
matrix, respectively. Tr(A) and det(A) represent the trace and determinant of A, respectively.
‖ · ‖2 denotes the matrix spectral norm and A0 indicates that the square matrix A is positive
semidefinite. rank(A) and ν(A) denote the rank of A and the unit-norm eigenvector associated
with the maximum eigenvalue of A, respectively. Also, (a)+=max{a, 0} is defined. The words
‘independent and identically distributed’ and ‘with respect to’ are abbreviated as ‘i.i.d.’ and
‘w.r.t.’, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider secure communications of the wirelessly powered HetNet,
in which an NM -antenna MBS used for information transmission coexists with an NP -antenna
PB deployed for wireless energy transfer and an NF -antenna FBS aiming for energy harvesting.
Note that the FBS is energy-limited and harvests energy for its communications from the RF
signals transmitted by the PB and the MBS. The MBS and the PB transmit the information-
bearing signal sM ∈ CNM and energy-bearing signal sP ∈ CNP to a single-antenna MU and an
NF -antenna FBS, respectively. Then the FBS transmits the confidential signal sF ∈ CNF to a
single-antenna FU, while a multi-antenna Eve aims for intercepting the signal of the FBS. We
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Fig. 1. A secrecy wirelessly powered HetNet.
focus our attention on the security of FBS and there is no cooperation between the MBS and the
FBS. Hence, the signals transmitted from the MBS and the FBS actually impose interference on
the FU and the MU, respectively. All wireless channels are assumed to be quasi-static flat-fading
and remain constant during a whole time slot T .
In the initial τT subslot, where 0 < τ < 1 denotes the time splitting factor, the FBS harvests
energy from both the PB energy signal sP and MBS interfering signal sM . Let’s define WP =
E[sP s
H
P ]∈CNP×NP as the covariance matrix of the PB energy signal sP subject to the maximum
transmit power PP , i.e. tr(WP ) ≤ PP , and for simplicity E[sMsHM ] = PMNM INM with PM being
the MBS maximum transmit power. By neglecting the contribution of thermal noise to the total
harvested energy at the FBS, the amount of energy harvested at the FBS is expressed as
E(WP ) = τT ξ
(
tr(HFWPH
H
F ) +
PM
NM
tr(GFG
H
F )
)
(1)
where 0 < ξ < 1 is the energy harvesting efficiency factor. HF ∈ CNF×NP and GF ∈ CNF×NM
denote the PB-FBS channel and MBS-FBS channel, respectively.
Next, in the second (1− τ)T subslot, the FBS transmits the confidential signal sF to the FU
by utilizing the harvested energy in (1). The signals received at the FU and the Eve are then
expressed as
yR = h
H
R sF + g
H
R sM + nR,
yE = HEsF +GEsM + nE , (2)
where hR ∈ CNF and gR ∈ CNM denote the FBS-FU channel and the MBS-FU channel,
respectively. HE ∈ CNE×NF and GE ∈ CNE×NM denote the FBS-EVE channel and the MBS-
EVE channel, respectively. nR ∼ CN (0, σ2n) and nE ∼ CN (0, σ2nINE) are i.i.d circularly
6symmetric Gaussian noises at the FU and the EVE, respectively. Additionally, we define PF =
E[sF s
H
F ]∈CNF×NF as the covariance matrix of the FBS information signal sF , the achievable
rates (in bps/Hz) at the FU and the EVE are then given by
RI = (1− τ) log2
(
1 +
hHRPFhR
σ2n +
PM
NM
‖gR‖2
)
,
RE = (1− τ) log2 det
(
INE+(σ
2
nINE +
PM
NM
GEG
H
E )
−1HEPFH
H
E
)
. (3)
According to [20], the achievable secrecy rate RS of the wirelessly powered HetNet is
actually the data rate at which the desired information is correctly decoded by the FU, while no
information is wiretapped by the EVE. Mathematically, we have
RS = [RI − RE ]+. (4)
In our work, we jointly optimize the PB and FBS transmit covariance matrices {WP ,PF} and
the time splitting factor τ for maximizing the achievable secrecy rate RS in (4). The resultant
SRM problem for the wirelessly powered HetNet is then formulated as
R⋆S = max
τ,WP0,PF0
RI − RE
s.t. CR1: 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, tr(WP ) ≤ PP
CR2: (1−τ)tr(PF )≤τξ
[
tr(HFWPH
H
F ) +
PM
NM
tr(GFG
H
F )
]
,
CR3: τhHMWPhM + (1−τ)gHp PFgp≤Ith. (5)
In problem (5), the constraint CR1 comes from the fact that the PB transmit power has a
maximum threshold, and CR2 denotes the energy causality constraint of the wirelessly powered
FBS. While CR3 models the average interference constraint of the secrecy wirelessly powered
HetNet. Specifically, by defining hM ∈ CNP and gp ∈ CNF as the PB-MU channel and the
FBS-MU channel, respectively, the terms hHMWPhM and g
H
p PFgp actually denote the total
interference at the MU originating from the PB and the FBS, respectively. Since the PB energy
transfer and the FBS information transfer are separated by the time splitting factor τ , we consider
the average interference power constraint at the MU as shown in CR3, where Ith denotes the
minimum tolerable interference. It is readily inferred from CR3 that problem (5) is feasible
for an arbitrary Ith ≥ 0. However, due to the highly coupled variables {τ,WP ,PF}, the SRM
problem (5) is generally non-convex and challenging to address.
7In the sequel, we will investigate the SRM under three different levels of the FBS-EVE CSI.
In the first case, the global CSI of the wirelessly powered HetNet is available at the FBS via
channel feedback and high-SNR training techniques. In the second case, by assuming imperfect
FBS-EVE CSI at the FBS, a pair of robust SRM problems are investigated under deterministic
and Gaussian random CSI errors, respectively. In the third case, we consider the more practical
scenario that the FBS is not aware of the existence of Eve. In other words, the FBS-EVE CSI
is completely unknown to the FBS.
III. PERFECT SRM UNDER GLOBAL CSI OF THE WIRELESSLY POWERED HETNET
In this section, a convexity-based one dimensional search is proposed for optimally solving
the SRM problem (5) under the global CSI of the wirelessly powered HetNet.
A. Transformation of Problem (5)
Firstly, by introducing an auxiliary variable η, the SRM problem (5) can be reformulated as
R⋆S = max
τ,WP0,PF0,η
(1− τ) log2
(
1 + C1h
H
RPFhR
)
−(1−τ) log2 η
s.t. CR1 ∼ CR3, CR4: det (INE+REHEPFHHE ) ≤ η, (6)
where C1 = (σ
2
n +
PM
NM
‖gR‖2)−1 and RE = (σ2nINE + PMNMGEGHE )−1. Unfortunately, problem (6)
is still difficult to address because of the nonconvex constraint CR4. In order to tackle this issue,
we firstly consider a relaxation of CR4 based on the following lemma.
Lemma 1. [26] For any positive semi-definite matrix A  0, we have det(I+A) ≥ 1+ tr(A),
where the equality holds if and only if rank(A) = 1.
By applying Lemma 1 to CR4, problem (6) is relaxed to
R˜⋆S = max
τ,WP0,PF0,η
(1− τ) log2
(
1 + C1h
H
RPFhR
)
−(1−τ) log2 η
s.t. CR1 ∼ CR3, CR4: 1+tr(REHEPFHHE ) ≤ η, (7)
where R˜⋆S denotes the achievable maximum secrecy rate by solving problem (7). Based on
Lemma 1, problem (7) clearly has a larger feasible region than problem (6), so that R˜⋆S ≥ R⋆S
8holds. We then introduce new variables W˜P = τWP and P˜F = (1−τ)PF to equivalently
transform problem (7) into
R˜⋆S = max
τ,W˜P0,P˜F0,η
(1− τ) log2
(
1 +
C1h
H
R P˜FhR
1−τ
η
)
s.t. C˜R1 : 0 ≤τ≤ 1, tr(W˜P )≤τPP , C˜R2 : tr(P˜F )≤ξtr(HFW˜PHHF )+ξτ
PM
NM
tr(GFG
H
F ),
C˜R3 : hHMW˜PhM+g
H
p P˜Fgp≤Ith, C˜R4 : 1−τ+tr
(
REHEP˜FH
H
E
) ≤ η(1−τ). (8)
It is concluded from problem (8) that for any fixed η the objective function is the perspective
of a strictly concave matrix function f(P˜F )=log2
(
1+C1hHR P˜FhR
η
)
, which is also strictly concave
[27, p. 39]. Moreover, all constraints in problem (8) are convex. Therefore, it is inferred that
problem (8) is jointly concave w.r.t. {τ,W˜P , P˜F} given any η, and can be globally solved by the
interior point method. To further investigate the tightness of the constraint C˜R3 when varying
Ith, we firstly consider solving problem (8) without C˜R3
max
τ,W˜P0,P˜F0,η
(1− τ) log2
(
1 +
C1h
H
R P˜FhR
1−τ
η
)
, s.t. C˜R1, C˜R2, C˜R4. (9)
Let’s define W˜P,Ith and P˜F,Ith as the optimal solution to problem (9). The corresponding
interference level is then expressed as I˜th = h
H
MW˜P,IthhM + g
H
p P˜F,Ithgp. When Ith > I˜th, it
is readily inferred that the constraint C˜R3 in problem (8) will be automatically satisfied using
the optimal solution {W˜P,Ith, P˜F,Ith} to problem (9), implying that in this context C˜R3 has no
effect on problem (8) and can be neglected without loss of optimality. While for the case of
0 ≤ Ith ≤ I˜th, we provide an interesting insight in the following Theorem.
Theorem 1. When 0 ≤ Ith ≤ I˜th, the constraint C˜R3 in problem (8) is tight, which implies that
the optimal solution to problem (8) lies at the boundary of hHMW˜PhM + g
H
p P˜Fgp=Ith.
Proof. Theorem 1 is proved by contradiction as follows. Firstly, we consider an interference
threshold I1th satisfying 0 ≤ I1th ≤ I˜th and denote the obtained R˜⋆S by solving problem (8) as
R˜⋆S = f
⋆
obj,I1
th
(Q1), where Q1 = {P˜⋆F,1,W˜⋆P,1, τ ⋆1 , η⋆1} is the optimal solution to problem (8) with
Ith = I
1
th and h
H
MW˜
⋆
P,1hM + g
H
p P˜
⋆
F,1gp < I
1
th is assumed. It is then easily found that there is
another interference threshold I2th satisfying I
2
th = h
H
MW˜
⋆
P,1hM+g
H
p P˜
⋆
F,1gp< I
1
th, based on which
the optimal solution Q1 actually becomes a feasible solution to problem (8). In other words,
we have f ⋆
obj,I1
th
(Q1) ≤ f ⋆obj,I2
th
(Q2), where Q2 = {P˜⋆F,2,W˜⋆P,2, τ ⋆2 , η⋆2} is the optimal solution
to problem (8) with Ith = I
2
th. On the other hand, since I
2
th < I
1
th, a smaller feasible region
9is observed for problem (8) with Ith = I
2
th, which thus yields f
⋆
obj,I1
th
(Q1) ≥ f ⋆obj,I2
th
(Q2). By
combining the above two inequalities, it is concluded that f ⋆
obj,I1
th
(Q1) = f ⋆obj,I2
th
(Q2). Similarly,
for an arbitrary threshold Ith ∈ [I2th, I1th], the same maximum objective value of problem (8)
is observed. This phenomenon hints that the constraint C˜R3 actually has no effect on problem
(8) and thus can be ignored without loss of optimality. As discussed before, this happens only
when Ith > I˜th, which contradicts to the original condition 0 ≤ Ith ≤ I˜th. Therefore, the initial
assumption of hHMW˜
⋆
P,1hM + g
H
p P˜
⋆
F,1gp< I
1
th is actually invalid, and we must have the optimal
solution {W˜⋆P,1, P˜⋆F,1} at the boundary of hHMW˜⋆P,1hM + gHp P˜⋆F,1gp= I1th for problem (8) when
0 ≤ I1th ≤ I˜th.
Since the globally optimal solution {τ,W˜P , P˜F} to problem (8) for any fixed η is available,
our remaining task is to find the globally optimal η, as presented in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Problem (8) is quasi-concave w.r.t. η, and the globally optimal η can be computed
by a one-dimensional search, i.e., Golden section search (GSS) [27].
Proof. Let’s rewrite problem (8) by introducing an auxiliary variable t as
max
τ,η,t,W˜P0,P˜F0
(1− τ) log2
(
1 +
C1h
H
R P˜FhR
1− τ
)
+t (10a)
s.t. C˜R1 ∼ C˜R3, (10b)
C˜R4 : 1−τ+tr(REHEP˜FHHE ) ≤ η(1−τ) (10c)
C˜R5 : t ≤ (1−τ) log2
1
η
. (10d)
Given any η, problem (10) is jointly and strictly concave w.r.t. {τ, t,W˜P , P˜F} and thus the
unqiue optimal solution exists. Based on this, it is readily inferred that the value of (10a) is
continuous on η. We observe that for a sufficiently small η, the value of (10a) is strongly
dominated by the active constraint (10c). Upon increasing η, the feasible region specified by
(10c) expands and thus the value of (10a) increases. However, when η becomes large enough,
the constraint (10d) with the small log2
1
η
actually dominates the value of (10a). In this context,
we find that the value of (10a) decreases with increasing η. According to the above analysis,
it can be inferred that there must exist a turning point ηˆ for problem (8). Specifically, with the
increase of small η, the value of (10a) firstly increases until η reaches ηˆ, and then decreases.
This property hints that problem (8) is unimodal (quasi-concave) w.r.t. η, of which the globally
optimal value can be found by GSS.
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According to Theorem 2, we firstly determine the one-dimensional search interval of η as
follows. For achieving a nonzero secrecy rate, the maximum value of η actually corresponds to
the maximum legitimate rate Rup of the FU, which is derived by solving the following problem
Rup = max
τ,W˜P0,P˜F0
(1− τ) log2
(
1 +
C1h
H
R P˜FhR
1− τ
)
, s.t. C˜R1 ∼ C˜R3. (11)
It is clear that problem (11) is also jointly concave w.r.t. {τ,W˜P , P˜F}. With the optimal
solution {R⋆up, τ ⋆1 } to problem (11), we readily infer that the value range of η is 1 ≤ η ≤ 2
R⋆up
1−τ⋆1 .
Overall, given any η, by combining the joint concavity of problem (8) with the GSS for finding
the globally-optimal η, the problem (8) can be optimally solved. More importantly, we further
prove that R⋆S = R˜
⋆
S holds for the PSRM problem (5) and the relaxed problem (8), as shown in
Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. Problem (8) is a tight relaxation of the perfect SRM problem (5). In other words,
the optimal solution {τ ⋆, η⋆,W˜⋆P , P˜⋆F} to problem (8) satisfies rank(W˜⋆P )=rank(P˜⋆F )=1 and thus
R˜⋆S=R
⋆
S holds. By recalling W˜P = τWP and P˜F = (1−τ)PF , the corresponding {τ ⋆,W⋆P ,P⋆F}
are also globally-optimal to problem (5).
Proof. Please refer to Appendix A.
Following the proof of Theorem 3, we propose a convexity-based linear search for globally
solving the perfect SRM problem (5). To be specific, given any η, the relaxed convex problem (8)
is firstly addressed for obtaining the optimal solution {τ ⋆,W⋆P ,P⋆F} (via variable substitution)
and the resultant achievable secrecy rate. Then the GSS is applied to find the globally-optimal
η⋆. Theorem 3 reveals that the optimal energy and information covariance matrices, i.e. W⋆P
and P⋆F , to problem (5) satisfy rank(W
⋆
P ) = rank(P
⋆
F ) = 1. Physically, this property means
that single-stream transmission of both PB and FBS are optimal for secrecy performance of the
wirelessly powered HetNet.
IV. ROBUST SRMS UNDER IMPERFECT FBS-EVE CSI
In this section, two types of robust SRM problems are investigated in depth for the secrecy
wirelessly powered HetNet. Specifically, one is the worst-case SRM associated with deterministic
FBS-EVE CSI error. In this case, we propose a convexity-based linear search method for finding
the optimal worst-case solution. The other is the outage-constrained SRM subject to Gaussian
random FBS-EVE CSI error, for which the convex reformulation is realized by introducing an
auxiliary variable.
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A. The Proposed Worst-Case SRM
Recall the system model in Section II, when considering deterministically imperfect FBS-
EVE channel, we have HE = ĤE+∆HE, where ĤEk denotes the estimated FBS-EVE channel
and ∆HE is the norm bounded CSI error, i.e, ‖∆HE‖F ≤ ξf . Based on this, the achievable
worst-case secrecy rate of the wirelessly powered HetNet is given by RS,Ro = RI − max
∆HE
RE ,
and the resultant worst-case SRM problem is formulated as
R⋆S,Ro = max
τ,WP0,PF0
min
∆HE
RI −RE , s.t. CR1 ∼ CR3. (12)
As with the reformulation of perfect SRM problem (5), we also introduce the auxiliary variable
η to reformulate problem (12) as
R⋆S,Ro = max
τ,WP0,PF0,η
(1− τ) log2
(
1 + C1h
H
RPFhR
)
−(1−τ) log2 η
s.t. CR1 ∼ CR3, CR5: det (INE+REHEPFHHE ) ≤ η, ‖∆HE‖F ≤ ξf . (13)
Compared to the perfect SRM problem (5), problem (13) is more challenging since the semi-
infinite norm bounded CSI error is included in CR5. To make problem (13) tractable, we firstly
relax it using the above Lemma 1 to
R˜⋆S,Ro = max
τ,WP0,PF0,η
(1− τ) log2
(
1 + C1h
H
RPFhR
)
−(1−τ) log2 η
s.t. CR1 ∼ CR3, CR5: 1+tr(REHEPFHHE ) ≤ η, ‖∆HE‖F ≤ ξf , (14)
where R˜⋆S,Ro denotes the maximum achievable worst-case secrecy rate by solving problem (14)
and satisfies R˜⋆S,Ro ≥ R⋆S,Ro due to larger feasible region of problem (14). For solving this non-
convex problem effectively, both the equality hE = vec((ĤE +∆HE)
H) = hˆE +∆hE and the
identity Tr(AHBCD) = vec(A)H(DT ⊗B)vec(C) are utilized to rewrite the constraint CR5 as
1 + (hˆE +∆hE)
H(RE ⊗PF )(hˆE +∆hE) ≤ η, ‖∆hE‖F ≤ ζf . (15)
Lemma 2. (S-procedure) [28] For the equation f(x) = xHAx + xHb + bHx + c, in which
x ∈ CN , A ∈ HN×N , b ∈ CN and c is a constant, the following equality holds
f(x)≤0, ∀x∈{x|tr(xxH)≤ǫe}⇔u

 IN 0N×1
0TN×1 −ǫe

−

 A b
bH c

0, with some u≥0. (16)
We then take advantage of Lemma 2 and auxiliary variables W˜P = τWP , P˜F = (1−τ)PF
to transform the nonlinear semi-infinite constraint (15) into a LMI. Then the relaxed WSRM
problem (14) is re-expressed as
12
R˜⋆S,Ro = maxτ,u,η,
W˜P0,P˜F0
(1− τ) log2
(
1 +
C1h
H
R P˜FhR
1− τ
)
−(1−τ) log2 η (17)
s.t. C˜R1∼ C˜R3, C˜R5 :

 uIN−(RTE ⊗ P˜F ) −(RTE⊗P˜F )hˆE
−hˆHE (RTE⊗P˜F ) (η−1)(1−τ)− uζ2f − hˆHE (RTE ⊗ P˜F )hˆE

0,
where a scalar variable u > 0 is introduced. In contrast to problem (8), an additional SDP
constraint C˜R5 is included in problem (17). For any fixed η, we easily find that C˜R5 is a convex
linear matrix inequality (LMI) w.r.t. {τ, u, P˜F}, so problem (17) becomes jointly concave w.r.t.
{τ, u,W˜P , P˜F}. Similar to Theorem 2, we can also prove that problem (17) is quasi-concave
w.r.t η, since the semi-infinite CSI error ∆hE in the equivalent problem (14) is independent
of η. Based on the above discussions, it is readily inferred that the proposed convexity-based
linear search for problem (8) can be directly extended to problem (17). More importantly, an
interesting insight is provided in the following Theorem, namely, problem (17) also admits the
rank-1 optimal solution.
Theorem 4. Problem (17) is a tight relaxation of the worst-case SRM problem (12), which
means that its optimal solution {τ ⋆, η⋆,W˜⋆P , P˜⋆F} satisfies rank(W˜⋆P ) = rank(P˜⋆F ) = 1 and
R˜⋆S,Ro = R
⋆
S,Ro. Meanwhile, the corresponding original variables {τ ⋆,W⋆P ,P⋆F} are optimal for
problem (12).
Proof. Please refer to Appendix C.
Generally, the proof of Theorem 4 subject to the complicated LMI constraint C˜R5 is more
difficult than that of Theorem 3. Based on Theorem 4, the globally optimal solution {τ ⋆,W⋆P ,P⋆F}
to the worst-case SRM problem (12) can also be obtained by successively solving the relaxed
problem (17), for which the proposed convexity-based linear search in Section III still works.
B. The Proposed Outage-Constrained SRM
It is widely recognized that the worst-case optimization is the most conservative robust design,
which is only encountered in practical systems with a low probability. Hence, in this subsection,
we consider the more general case of statistically imperfect CSI, in which the FBS-EVE CSI
error is assumed to be complex Gaussian distributed, i.e., ∆hE = vec(∆H
H
E ) ∼ CN (0,CE),
where CE ∈ CNFNE×NFNE denotes the positive semi-definite error covariance matrix. Inspired by
the fact that under the unbounded Gaussian error ∆hE , an absolutely safe beamforming design
cannot be guaranteed, we instead consider the outage-constrained SRM to implement secure
communications in the wirelessly powered HetNet. More specifically, by defining the maximum
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secrecy rate outage probability pout, a 100(1−pout)%-safe design of our wirelessly powered
HetNet is investigated. Mathematically, the outage-constrained SRM problem is formulated as
max
τ0,WP0,PF0
RS, s.t. CR1 ∼ CR3, CR6 : Pr∆HE{RI −RE ≥ RS} ≥ 1− pout. (18)
Clearly, the secrecy outage constraint CR6 indicates that the probability of the achievable
secrecy rate being over RS should be higher than 1−pout, and problem (18) aims for maximizing
this 100pout%-outage secrecy rate threshold RS . However, problem (18) is computationally
intractable since the constraint CR6 does not have an explicit expression. Therefore, we consider
replacing the function RI−RE in CR6 by an easy-to-handle function via the following Lemmas.
Lemma 3. [29] For an arbitrary positive-definite matrix E ∈ CN×N , we have − ln det(E) =
max
S0
− tr(SE) + ln det(S) +N , where the optimal S⋆ is derived as S⋆ = E−1.
Lemma 4. (Bernstein-type inequality (BTI) [24]) For an arbitrary vector x ∈ CN (0, I), we
assume f(x) = xHAx+ 2Re{xHb}+ c, where A ∈ HN×N , b ∈ CN and c is a constant. Then
for any pout ∈ [0, 1], the following convex approximation holds, i.e.
Prx{f(x)≤0}≥1−pout ⇐=


tr(A) +
√−2 ln poutt1 − t2 ln pout + c ≤ 0∥∥∥∥∥∥

 vec(A)√
2u


∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ t1
t2In −A  0, t2 ≥ 0
, (19)
where t1 and t2 are a pair of slack variables.
Firstly, by invoking Lemma 3, the wiretap rate RE of the EVE can be rewritten as
−RE = (1− τ)
ln 2
max
S0
− tr[S(INE+R 12EHEPFHHER 12E)]+ ln det(S) +NE . (20)
We further substitute (20) into problem (18) to obtain the reformulated constraint CR6 as
Pr∆HE
{
tr(SR
1
2
EHEPFH
H
ER
1
2
E)− L ≤ 0
}
≥ 1− pout (21)
where L = ln
(
1 + C1h
H
RPFhR
) − tr(S) + ln detS + NE − ln 2RS1−τ . Since ∆hE ∼ CN (0,CE),
we can re-express ∆hE as ∆hE =C
1
2
Exe with xe ∼ CN (0, INFNE). Furthermore, through the
vectorization of (21), we have
Pr∆xe
{
∆xHe C
1
2
EPSC
1
2
E∆xe + 2Re{∆xHe C
1
2
EPShˆE}+ hˆHEPShˆE − L ≤ 0
}
≥ 1− pout, (22)
where PS = (R
1
2
ESR
1
2
E)
T ⊗PF . To make the probabilistic constraint (22) tractable, we adopt a
popular conservative approximation, the so-called BTI in Lemma 4, for transforming it into
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a series of tractable convex constraints. Then the outage-constrained SRM problem (18) is
reformulated as
max
t1,t2,τ,WP0,
PF0,S0
RS, s.t. CR1∼CR3, CR6 :


tr(ĤCEPS)+
√−2 ln poutt1−t2 ln pout − ln(1+C1hHRPFhR)
+tr(S)−ln detS−NE+ ln 2RS1−τ ≤ 0∥∥∥∥∥∥

 vec(C 12EPSC 12E)√
2C
1
2
E
PShˆE


∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ t1
t2INFNE −C
1
2
E
PSC
1
2
E
 0, t2 ≥ 0
,
(23)
where ĤCE= hˆEhˆ
H
E +CE. Although problem (23) is still not jointly concave w.r.t {τ,WP ,PF ,
S}, it is more tractable than the outage-constrained SRM problem (18). Specifically, by utilizing
W˜P =τWP , P˜F =(1−τ)PF and S˜=τS, we easily find that problem (23) is jointly concave w.r.t.
{τ,W˜P , P˜F} when fixing S, which is similar to problems (8) and (17). In turn, problem (23)
is also concave w.r.t. S when fixing {τ,WP ,PF}. Interestingly, we also validate that problem
(23) admits the optimal rank-1 solution, as shown in the following Theorem.
Theorem 5. The optimal solution {W⋆P ,P⋆F} to problem (23) satisfies rank(W⋆P )=rank(P⋆F )=
1, which is also a high-quality solution for the computationally intractable problem (18).
Proof. Please refer to Appendix C.
Based on the above analysis, we propose an alternating optimization procedure for efficiently
solving problem (23) in the sequel. The first subproblem for optimizing {t˜1, t˜2, τ,W˜P , P˜F} given
S is expressed as
max
t˜1,t˜2,τ,W˜P0,P˜F0
RS,
s.t. C˜R1∼ C˜R3, C˜R6 :


C˜R6a : tr(ĤCEP˜S) +
√−2 ln poutt˜1 − t˜2 ln pout+(1−τ)tr(S)
−(1−τ) ln detS−(1−τ)NE+ln2RS≤(1−τ) ln(1+ C1h
H
R
P˜FhR
1−τ
)
C˜R6b :
∥∥∥∥∥∥

 vec(C 12EP˜SC 12E)√
2C
1
2
E
P˜S hˆE


∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ t˜1
C˜R6c : t˜2INFNE−C
1
2
E
P˜SC
1
2
E
 0, t˜2 ≥ 0,
, (24)
where P˜S = (R
1
2
ESR
1
2
E)
T ⊗ P˜F . Due to the joint concavity of problem (24), we can optimally
recover a high-quality suboptimal solution {τ,WP ,PF} to problem (18) from the obtained
optimal rank-1 solution of problem (24). Then the second subproblem for optimizing S given
{τ,WP ,PF} is formulated as
max
t˜1,t˜2,S0
RS, s.t. CR1 ∼ CR3, C˜R6. (25)
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Since problem (25) is also jointly concave w.r.t. {t˜1, t˜2,S  0}, it is concluded that the global
optimality at each iteration is guaranteed and the achievable secrecy rate RS is nondecreasing
within the whole iterative process. Moreover, considering the closed and finite feasible region
of problem (23), the proposed alternating optimization procedure for problem (23) is guaranteed
to converge to a locally optimal secrecy rate value.
V. SECURE COMMUNICATIONS UNDER COMPLETELY UNKNOWN FBS-EVE CSI
In the previous two Sections, both full and partial FBS-EVE CSI are considered for jointly
optimizing the PB energy covariance matrix, the FBS information covariance matrix and the
time splitting factor. Nevertheless, in practice, the EVE may be passive and the FBS is unaware
of the existence of the EVE. In this context, we accordingly propose artificial noise (AN) aided
scheme for secrecy wirelessly powered HetNets. With this scheme, the FBS simultaneously
transmits the confidential signal sF and AN zF to the FU, i.e., xF = sF +zF , for sufficiently
interfering the EVE without affecting the FU. Hence, the generated AN should be in the null-
space of the FBS-FU channel, i.e., hRzF = 0. We then express the AN as zF =H
⊥
RnF , where
H⊥R ∈ CNF×(NF−1) denotes the orthogonal complement space of hR and nF ∼ CN (0,ΣU) is a
novel (NF−1)-dimensional AN vector with the positive semi-definite covariance matrix ΣU0.
Since the FBS-EVE CSI is unavailable at the FBS, the direct secrecy rate optimization of the
considered wirelessly powered HetNet is infeasible. As an alternative, we consider maximizing
the average AN power (1−τ)tr(ΣU) at the EVE subject to the minimum legitimate rate at the
FU, so as to impose as much interference as possible on the potential EVE for reducing its
wiretaping capability. The AN aided secrecy problem is ultimately formulated as
max
τ,WP0,PF0,ΣU0
(1−τ)tr(ΣU)
s.t. CR1,CR3, AR2 : (1− τ) log2
(
1 +
hHRPFhR
σ2n +
PM
NM
‖gR‖2
)
≥ Rth
AR3 : (1−τ)tr(PF+ΣU)≤ τξ
[
tr(HFWPH
H
F ) +
PM
NM
tr(GFG
H
F )
]
(26)
Naturally, problem (26) with coupled variables is not jointly concave w.r.t {τ,WP ,PF ,ΣU}.
Based on the definitions W˜P = τWP , P˜F = (1 − τ)PF and Σ˜U = (1 − τ)ΣU , problem (26)
can be rewritten as
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max
τ,W˜P0,P˜F0,Σ˜U0
tr(Σ˜U)
s.t. C˜R1, C˜R3, A˜R2 : (1− τ) log2
(
1 +
C1h
H
R P˜FhR
1− τ
)
≥ Rth
A˜R3 : tr(P˜F+Σ˜U)≤ ξtr(HFW˜PHHF ) + ξτ
PM
NM
tr(GFG
H
F ). (27)
Similar to problems (8) and (17), problem (27) composed of a linear objective function and
concave constraints is also jointly concave w.r.t {τ,W˜P , P˜F , Σ˜U}, and thus can be optimally
solved. Moreover, the optimal rank-1 solution {W˜⋆P , P˜⋆F , Σ˜⋆U} to problem (27) is revealed in the
following Theorem.
Theorem 6. There always exists an optimal solution {W⋆P ,P⋆F ,Σ⋆U} with rank(W⋆P ) = rank(P⋆F ) =
rank(Σ⋆U) = 1 for the AN aided secrecy problem (26).
Proof. Please refer to Appendix D.
Theorem 7. For all the above cases of FBS-EVE CSI, if the cross-interference constraint CR3
is inactive, a closed-form expression for the PB energy covariance matrix can be derived as
W⋆P = PPwPw
H
P with wP = νmax(H
H
FHF ).
Proof. Please refer to Appendix E.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, numerical simulation results are provided for quantifying the secrecy rate
performance of the wirelessly powered HetNet. Unless otherwise stated, in the following simu-
lations the MBS, the PB, the FBS and the EVE are equipped with NM = 2, NP = 4, NF = 4
and NE = 3 antennas, respectively. Furthermore, a single-antenna MU and a single-antenna
FU are considered. The locations of the MBS, the MU and the PB are (0, 0)m, (150, 0)m and
(100, 100)m, respectively. Since the FBS mainly harvests wireless energy from the PB, the FBS
location is near the PB and thus set as (105, 105)m. Moreover, the FU and the EVE are located
at (105, 200)m and (155, 105)m, respectively. For the perfect SRM (PSRM), we assume that all
channel coefficients follow the i.i.d. Rayleigh distribution with zero mean and 10−3d−α variance,
where d denotes the actual distance between two arbitrary terminals and α = 2 is the pathloss
exponent. The Gaussian noise variance is set as σ2n = −110dBm. The maximum transmit power
of the MBS and PB are defined as PM = 10dBm and PP = 20dBm, respectively. The FBS energy
harvesting efficiency is ξ = 0.8. Initially, we fix the interference threshold to be Ith = −65dBm.
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Fig. 2. Achievable secrecy rates of the proposed PSRM and WSRM versus the parameter η to validate Theorem 2.
For the worst-case SRM (WSRM), the bound of FBS-EVE CSI error is set as ξf = 0.2. By
contrast, for the outage-constrained SRM (OSRM), the covariance matrix of FBS-EVE CSI error
CE and the outage probability pout are defined as CE = ζ
2INE with ζ = 0.05 and pout = 0.1,
respectively. Finally, for the proposed AN scheme, an legitimate rate threshold at the FU is
chosen as Rth =
Rmax
2
, where Rmax denotes the maximum achievable rate of the wirelessly
powered HetNet without the EVE and can be optimally derived according to [11]. Note that all
simulation points are plotted by averaging over 200 Monte-Carlo experiments.
Additionally, we consider four benchmarks for the proposed secrecy beamforming designs
under three different levels of FBS-EVE CSI. Specifically, for both the perfect and unknown
FBS-EVE CSI cases, the equal power allocation schemes are adopted at the FBS ( also referred
to as FBS-EPA) with the fixed and optimized time allocation, i.e. τ = 1
2
and τ = τ ⋆, respectively.
Moreover, both the two benchmarks assume WP =
PP
NP
INP . While for the imperfect FBS-EVE
CSI, the nonrobust SRM scheme in [11] is adopted as a benchmark for the proposed WSRM,
where the achievable secrecy rate is calculated by substituting the optimal solution {τ,WP ,PF}
derived when ξ = 0 into the worst-case FBS-EVE channel. Furthermore, by referring to [10],
the worst-case SRM with the error bound ξ =
√
η
2
F−1
χ22NFNE
(1− pout) is actually a conservative
approximation for the proposed OSRM, where F−1
χ22NFNE
(·) denotes the inverse cumulative density
function (CDF) of a Chisquare random variable with degrees of freedom 2NFNE. Therefore,
we also consider it to be a benchmark for the proposed OSRM. 1
1Notice that if the predefined interference level Ith is not realized by the adopted benchmarks, the corresponding achievable
secrecy rate is set to zero.
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Fig. 3. Achievable secrecy rates for different schemes versus the PB transmit power PP with (a) NE = 3 and (b) NE = 4.
A. The Proposed Perfect and Worst-Case SRMs
In this subsection, we evaluate the achievable secrecy rates of the proposed PSRM and WSRM
in Section III and Section IV-A corresponding to problem (8) and problem (17), respectively.
Firstly, to validate Theorem 2, the achievable secrecy rates of the above two schemes over a
feasible range of η are shown in Fig. 2, where different PB transmit power PP = 0, 5dBm are
considered. It is clearly observed from Fig. 2 that both the PSRM problem (8) and WSRM
problem (17) are unimodal (quasi-concave) functions of η, and thus the globally optimal η can
be determined via the GSS.
Next, Fig. 3 depicts the achievable secrecy rates of all schemes versus the PB transmit power
PP with different numbers of EVE’s antennas NE . From Fig. 3 (a) with NE = 3, we readily
find that the achievable secrecy rates of all schemes increase with PP . The proposed PSRM
realizes the highest secrecy rate among all schemes. While the proposed WSRM considering the
influence of practical CSI error on the secrecy beamforming design naturally performs better
than the nonrobust counterpart. By comparing the two adopted FBS-EPA benchmarks, we clearly
see that time allocation plays an important role in improving secrecy rate performance of the
wirelessly powered HetNet. Furthermore, in Fig. 3 (b) with NE = 4, the same comparisons
among all schemes as in Fig. 3 (a) can be observed. Moreover, each scheme achieves a lower
secrecy rate than its counterpart in Fig. 3 (a) due to the increased EVE’s wiretap capability.
Fig. 4 investigates the achievable secrecy rates of all schemes versus the interference level
Ith. We clearly find from Fig. 4 that the secrecy rate value for each scheme firstly increases with
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Fig. 4. Achievable secrecy rates for different schemes versus the interference level Ith.
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Fig. 5. Achievable secrecy rates for different schemes versus the PB transmit power PP under different outage probabilities.
Ith until Ith reaches a certain threshold I
mi
th , then becomes saturated. Here, I
mi
th represents the
optimal solution of the PSRM problem (8) or the WSRM problem (17) with the interference
constraint neglected. This is because that when a small 0 < Ith ≤ Imith is adopted, it is easily
inferred that the achievable secrecy rates of all schemes are dominated by the cross-interference
constraint. In this context, since the feasible regions of both problems (8) and (17) expand with
the increasing Ith, the corresponding achievable secrecy rates also increase. However, when
Ith becomes sufficiently large, i.e Ith > I
mi
th , the cross-interference constraint actually becomes
inactive and thus has no effect on achievable secrecy rates. That is to say, the achievable secrecy
rates become saturated regardless of the increasing Ith when Ith > I
mi
th . In particular, the saturated
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Fig. 6. Achievable secrecy rates for different schemes versus the CSI error variance ζ under different interference levels Ith.
secrecy rate value can be derived from problem (8)((17)) by neglecting the cross-interference
constraint. Additionally, the proposed PSRM still has the best secrecy rate performance among
all schemes and the proposed WSRM provides much higher secrecy rate than the nonrobust
SRM.
B. The Proposed Outage-Constrained SRM
In this subsection, we investigate the achievable secrecy rates of the proposed OSRM, i.e.
problem (18) in Section IV. B. As mentioned before, the proposed WSRM with FBS-EVE’s CSI
error bound ξf =
√
η
2
F−1
χ22NFNE
(1− pout) can be regarded as another conservation reformulation
for the intractable outage probability constraint, so we also adopt it as a benchmark for fair
comparisons hereafter.
Fig. 5 shows secrecy rate performance for all schemes versus PB transmit power PP under
different outage probabilities pout = 0.1, 0.5. We firstly observe from Fig. 5 that for both
considered pout, the achievable secrecy rates of the proposed PSRM, WSRM and OSRM all
increase with PP . Meanwhile, the proposed OSRM has a better secrecy rate performance than
the proposed WSRM, while the nonrobust SRM performs worst due to the ignorance of CSI
error. Furthermore, we find that for each scheme the higher secrecy rate is realized with the
outage probability Pout=0.5. This is because that when the outage tolerance is relaxed, i.e. from
Pout=0.1 to Pout=0.5, the corresponding secrecy outage rate threshold also becomes higher.
Fig. 6 illustrates secrecy rate performance of all schemes versus the CSI error variance ζ with
different interference levels Ith = −65,−70dBm. On the one hand, for each Ith, we observe that
the achievable secrecy rates of all schemes decrease with the increasing ζ . The proposed OSRM
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Fig. 8. Artificial noise power for different schemes versus the legitimate rate threshold Rth.
still has better secrecy rate performance than the proposed WSRM. While the nonrobust SRM
performs the worst. Moreover, the performance gaps between the proposed OSRM and the other
two schemes both become larger when ζ increases. On the other hand, the higher secrecy rates
of all schemes are observed at the interference level Ith =−65dBm due to the larger feasible
region of our secrecy beamforming design.
C. The proposed AN scheme
In this subsection, our goal is to illustrate the optimal artificial noise power (ANP) of the
proposed AN scheme in Section V. In Fig. 7, the optimized ANP for different schemes versus
the PB transmit power PP with different interference thresholds Ith = −70,+∞ is shown,
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where the legitimate rate threshold is set as Rth = 1.5(bps/Hz).
2 We firstly find from Fig. 7 the
achieved ANP increases with PP for all three schemes. Moreover, the proposed AN scheme has
the highest ANP compared to the other two schemes, implying that the strongest interference is
imposed on the EVE to reduce its wiretapping capability.
Fig. 8 shows the optimal ANP for different schemes versus the legitimate rate threshold Rth.
It is clear from Fig. 8 that for each scheme, the optimized ANP decreases with the increasing
Rth since the more portion of PB transmit power PP is allocated for information transfer to the
FU for achieving the rate threshold Rth. Furthermore, the proposed AN scheme still realizes
the highest ANP among all schemes, which promotes secure communications of the wirelessly
powered HetNet via sufficiently interfering the malicious Eve.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated secure communications of the wirelessly powered HetNet from
different perspectives of the FBS-EVE CSI. Firstly, in the case of perfect FBS-EVE CSI, the per-
fect and worst-case SRMs was studied by jointly optimizing the PB energy and FBS information
covariance matrices as well as the time splitting factor, which can be globally addressed by the
proposed convexity-based linear search. Secondly, considering deterministically and statistically
imperfect cases of FBS-EVE CSI, we applied S-procedure and BTI to transform intractable
CSI error related constraints into a series of tractable convex ones, respectively. Finally, for
the completely unknown FBS-EVE CSI case, an AN aided secrecy beamforming design was
proposed to interfere the EVE as much as possible. In particular, when the cross-interference
constraint is negligible, the closed-form PB energy covariance matrix for all conisidred cases can
be derived. More importantly, we also proved the rank-1 property of the optimal solutions for
all studied SRM problems. Numerical experiments verified the excellent secrecy performance of
all our proposed secrecy beamforming designs.
APPENDIX A
Firstly, assuming the fixed τ and η, we can reexpress the relaxed SRM problem (8) as
R˜⋆S = max
0≤τ≤1,η≥1


max
W˜P0,P˜F0
C1h
H
R P˜FhR
s.t. C˜R1 ∼ C˜R4
. (28)
2 Notice that for some small PP , by which the legitimate rate threshold Rth is not supported, we correspondingly set the
achievable secrecy rate to be zero.
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Then the proof for Theorem 3 consists of two steps: In the first step, we prove that for any
given τ and η, the optimal solution {W˜P,1, P˜F,1} to the inner maximization problem in (30)
is of rank-1. In the second step, we show that {W˜P,1, P˜F,1} is also optimal to problem (6) (
equivalent to the perfect SRM problem (5)), when the same τ and η are adopted. As a result,
the equivalence between problem (8) and the perfect SRM problem (5) is established.
Step 1: To prove that the optimal solution to the inner maximization problem in (30) is
of rank-1, we firstly consider its equivalent counterpart, i.e. the following power minimization
problem
min
W˜P0,P˜F0
tr(P˜F ), s.t. C˜R1 ∼ C˜R4; P˜R1 : C1hHR P˜FhR ≥ fη,τ (29)
where fη,τ denotes the maximum objective value of the inner maximization problem in (30).
Clearly, problem (29) is still convex with the linear objective function and convex constraints.
In fact, the optimal solution of the inner maximization problem in (30) is the same as that
of problem (29), which can be proved by contradiction. Firstly, by assuming that the optimal
solution to the inner maximization problem in (30) and problem (29) are {W˜P,1, P˜F,1} and
{W˜P,2, P˜F,2}, respectively, we readily find that (W˜P,2, P˜F,2) is feasible for the inner maximiza-
tion problem in (30) and thus we have C1h
H
R P˜F,2hR ≤ C1hHR P˜F,1hR = fη,τ . Furthermore, since
(W˜P,2, P˜F,2) also satisfies P˜R1, it is inferred that C1h
H
R P˜F,2hR = fη,τ . Clearly, the optimal
solution (W˜P,2, P˜F,2) to problem (29) is also optimal to the inner maximization problem in
(30). In the sequel, we instead investigate the rank-1 property of the optimal solution to problem
(29) through Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, which are shown in (30) at the top of this
page. Here, {λ, β, γ, ρ, ψ} denote non-negative lagrangian multipliers for constraints {C˜R1,C˜R2,
C˜R3, C˜R4, P˜R1} in problem (29), respectively. While ZP  0 and ZF  0 are the lagrangian
multipliers corresponding to W˜P  0 and P˜F  0, respectively. Based on (30a) and (30c), we
have
(
(1+β⋆)INF+γ
⋆gPg
H
P +ρ
⋆HHEREHE
)
P˜⋆F =ψ
⋆C1hRh
H
R P˜
⋆
F , implying that
rank
((
(1 + β⋆)INF + γ
⋆gPg
H
P + ρ
⋆HHEREHE
)
P˜⋆F
)
= rank(P˜⋆F )
= rank(ψ⋆C1hRh
H
R P˜
⋆
F ) ≤ 1 (31)
where the first equality in (31) is due to (1+ β⋆)INF + γ
⋆gPg
H
P + ρ
⋆HHEREHE ≻ 0. According
to (31), the rank-1 optimal P˜⋆F to problem (29) is proved.
As for the optimal W˜⋆P , we refer to (30b) and (30c) to obtain
λ⋆INP − H˜⋆ = Z⋆P  0, (λ⋆INP − H˜⋆)W˜⋆P = 0, (32)
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(1 + β⋆)INF + γ
⋆gPg
H
P + ρ
⋆HHEREHE − ψ⋆C1hRhHR − Z⋆F = 0 (30a)
λ⋆INP + γ
⋆hMh
H
M − β⋆ξHHFHF − Z⋆P = 0 (30b)
Z⋆F P˜
⋆
F = 0, Z
⋆
PW˜
⋆
P = 0 (30c)
λ⋆(tr(W˜⋆P )− τPP ) = 0 (30d)
β⋆(tr(P˜⋆F )−ξtr(HFW˜⋆PHHF )− ξτ
PM
NM
tr(GFG
H
F )) = 0 (30e)
γ⋆(hHMW˜
⋆
PhM + g
H
p P˜
⋆
Fgp − Ith) = 0 (30f)
ρ⋆((1− η)(1− τ) + tr(REHEP˜⋆FHHE )) = 0 (30g)
ψ⋆(C1h
H
R P˜
⋆
FhR − fη,τ ) = 0 (30h)
where H˜⋆ = β⋆ξHHFHF−γ⋆hMhHM . Observing from (32), if λ⋆ = 0, then we have β⋆ξHHFHF 
γ⋆hMh
H
M , for which β
⋆ = 0 is derived since rank(ξHHFHF ) > rank(hMh
H
M) = 1 is implied by
our system setting. The optimal W˜⋆P is then derived as hMh
H
MW˜
⋆
P = 0. Clearly, there must
exist a rank-1 optimal W˜⋆P in the null space of hM . However, if λ
⋆ > 0, then we have the
eigenvalue decomposition (EVD) of H˜⋆ as H˜⋆=U˜HΛ˜HU˜
H
H , where the maximum eigenvalue
λ˜H,max in the diagonal matrix Λ˜H must be positive. Otherwise, β
⋆ξHHFHF  γ⋆hMhHM is
implied and only obtained at β⋆ = 0 as mentioned above. Based on (32), we then have W˜⋆P = 0
since λ⋆ > 0, which contradicts with (30d). So λ⋆ > 0 yields λ˜H,max > 0 and thus we have
λ⋆INP−H˜⋆ = U˜H(λ⋆INP−Λ˜H)U˜HH  0. Further, to ensure W˜⋆P 6= 0 in (32), it is easily inferred
that λ⋆ = λ˜H,max and thus W˜
⋆
P = cuPu
H
P is obtained, where uP is the unit-norm eigenvector
of H˜⋆ corresponding to λH,max. Moreover, since λ
⋆ = λ˜H,max > 0, it yields that tr(W˜
⋆
P ) = τPP
and thus W˜⋆P = τPPuPu
H
P can be obtained from (30d).
Both cases of λ⋆ demonstrate that the optimal W˜⋆P to problem (29) is of rank-1. Overall, the
rank-1 optimal solution {W˜P , P˜F} of the inner maximization problem in (30) is proved.
Step 2: Firstly, we assume that the optimal solution of the inner maximization problem in
(30) (equivalent to problem ) and problem (6) with the same {η, τ} are {W˜P,1, P˜F,1} and
{W˜P,0, P˜F,0}, respectively. The corresponding objective function is defined as f(W˜P , P˜F ).
Based on Lemma 1, for any given η and τ , the relaxed SRM problem (8) actually has a larger
feasible solution region than problem (6), hence, we have f(W˜P,1, P˜F,1) ≥ f(W˜P,0, P˜F,0).
Furthermore, since both W˜P,1, and P˜F,1 are of rank-1 as proved in Step 1, we also find that
{W˜P,1, P˜F,1} is feasible to problem (6), which implies that f(W˜P,1, P˜F,1) ≤ f(W˜P,0, P˜F,0).
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Combining the above two inequalities, we finally have f(W˜P,1, P˜F,1) = f(W˜P,0, P˜F,0).
Given any τ and η, it is concluded that such a two-tupple {W˜P,1, P˜F,1} from the relaxed SRM
problem (8) (inner maximization problem in (30)) is optimal to problem (6). Notice that problem
(6) with the optimal τ ⋆ and η⋆ is equivalent to the original SRM problem (5), Therefore, the
equivalence between problem (8) and the PSRM problem (5) is established as that in Theorem 3.
APPENDIX B
Notice that this proof follows the same logic as that provided for Theorem 3. Firstly, assuming
the fixed τ and η, we can reexpress the relaxed robust SRM problem (17) as
R˜⋆S,Ro = max
0≤τ≤1,η≥1


max
W˜P0,P˜F0
C1h
H
R P˜FhR
s.t. C˜R1 ∼ C˜R3
C˜R5 : I˜E − R˜E(IN ⊗ P˜F )R˜HE  0
(33)
where I˜E =

 uIN 0
0 η − 1− µξ2f

 and R˜E =

 R 12TE ⊗ IN
hˆHE (R
1
2
T
E ⊗ IN)

 . The proof of Theorem 4
is similar to that of Theorem 3 and also consists of the following two steps.
In the first step, we prove that for any given τ and η, the rank-1 optimal solution {W˜P , P˜F}
of the inner maximization problem in (33) is obtained. In the second step, we show that such
an {W˜P , P˜F} is also optimal to the WSRM problem (12). As a result, the equivalence between
the relaxed WSRM problem (17) and the original WSRM problem (12) are established.
Similarly, for proving the rank-1 nature of the optimal solution to the inner maximization
problem in (33), we consider the corresponding power minimization problem given τ and η as
min
W˜P0,P˜F0
tr(P˜F ), s.t. C˜R1 ∼ C˜R3; C˜R5; P˜R1 : C1hHR P˜FhR ≥ fˆη,τ ., (34)
where fˆη,τ denotes the optimal objective value of the inner maximization problem in (33) given
any τ and η. It is readily observed that problem (34) is also convex. Following the same
philosophy in Step 1 of Appendix A, we readily verify that the optimal solution of problem
(34) is also optimal to the inner maximization problem in (33). In the sequel, we aim to show
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that the optimal solution {W˜P , P˜F} of problem (34) for any fixed τ and η are of rank-1 through
KKT conditions, which are
(1 + β⋆)INF + γ
⋆gPg
H
P + ρ
⋆HHEREHE +
NE∑
i=1
R˜HE,iZRR˜E,i − ψ⋆C1hRhHR − Z⋆F = 0 (35a)
Z⋆R(˜IE − R˜E(IN ⊗ P˜F )R˜HE ) = 0 (35b)
(30b) ∼ (30f), (30h) (35c)
where ZR  0 is lagrangian multiplier for C˜R5. Based on (35a) and (30c), we have
rank
((
(1 + β⋆)INF + γ
⋆gPg
H
P + ρ
⋆HHEREHE +
NE∑
i=1
R˜HE,iZRR˜E,i
)
P˜⋆F
)
= rank(P˜⋆F )
= rank(ψ⋆C1hRh
H
R P˜
⋆
F ) ≤ 1. (36)
It is clear from (36) that the optimal P˜⋆F to problem (34) is of rank-1. In addition, since the
W˜P related KKT conditions of problem (34) are the same as that of problem (29). Let’s refer
to Step 1 of Appendix C to prove the rank-1 optimal W˜⋆P to problem (34). As such, the rank-1
optimal solution {P˜⋆F ,W˜⋆P} to problem (34) are finally verified.
APPENDIX C
According to [30] and following the same argument as Step 1 of Appendix A, the outage-
constrained SRM problem (23) given any {τ,S} is equivalent to the following power minimiza-
tion problem
min
W˜P0,P˜F0
tr(P˜F ), s.t. C˜R1 ∼ C˜R3, C˜R6|RS=R1S , (37)
where R1S denotes the optimal objective value of the problem (23) with fixed τ and S. In other
words, the optimal solution {P˜⋆F ,W˜⋆P} to problem (37) is also optimal to problem (23) given
the same τ and S. In the sequel, we firstly prove the rank-1 optimal P˜⋆F to problem (37). First
of all, we define the projection matrix T of the vector P˜
1
2
⋆
F hR as T =
P˜
1
2 ⋆
F
hRh
H
R
P˜
1
2 ⋆
F
‖hH
R
P˜
1
2 ⋆
F
‖2
, then a novel
rank-1 solution P̂⋆F = P˜
1
2
⋆
F TP˜
1
2
⋆
F is available and satisfies
tr(P̂⋆F )− tr(P˜⋆F ) = tr(P˜
1
2
⋆
F (T− I)P˜
1
2
⋆
F ) ≤ 0. (38)
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The formulation (38) yields tr(P̂⋆F ) ≤ tr(P˜⋆F ), which hints that the objective value of problem
(23) is non-increasing while still satisfying constraints C˜R1 ∼ C˜R2. Moreover, observing from
C˜R6, we have
log2
(
1 +
C1h
H
R P̂
⋆
FhR
1− τ
)
= log2
(
1 +
C1|hHR P˜⋆FhR|2
(1− τ)‖P˜
1
2
⋆
F hR‖2
)
= log2
(
1 +
C1h
H
R P˜
⋆
FhR
1− τ
)
(39)
as well as
log2 det
(
INE+
REHEP̂
⋆
FH
H
E
1− τ
)
= log2
(
INE+
REHEP˜
1
2
⋆
F TP˜
1
2
⋆
F H
H
E
(1− τ)
)
= log2
(
1+
hHR P˜
1
2
⋆
F (P˜
1
2
⋆
F H
H
EREHEP˜
1
2
⋆
F )P˜
1
2
⋆
F hR
(1− τ)‖hHR P˜
1
2
⋆
F ‖2
)
≤ log2
(
1+
λmax(P˜
1
2
⋆
F H
H
EREHEP˜
1
2
⋆
F )
1− τ
)
≤ log2 det(INF +
P˜
1
2
⋆
F H
H
EREHEP˜
1
2
⋆
F
1− τ ) = log2 det(INE +
REHEP˜
⋆
FH
H
E
1− τ ). (40)
Based on (39) and (40), it yields
log2
(
1 +
C1h
H
R P̂
⋆
FhR
1− τ
)− log2 det
(
INE+
REHEP̂
⋆
FH
H
E
1− τ
)
≥ log2
(
1 +
C1h
H
R P˜
⋆
FhR
1− τ
)− log2 det
(
INE+
REHEP˜
⋆
FH
H
E
1− τ
)
, (41)
which means that the constraint C˜R6 still holds by using the novel solution P̂⋆F . Similarly, by
referring to (38) and the following inequality
gHp P̂
⋆
Fgp = g
H
p P˜
1
2
⋆
F TP˜
1
2
⋆
F gp =
|gHp P˜
1
2
⋆
F P˜
1
2
⋆
F hR|2
‖P˜
1
2
⋆
F hR‖2
≤ gHp P˜⋆Fgp, (42)
the constraint C˜R3 can also be satisfied with {P̂⋆F ,W˜⋆P}. This phenomenon indicates that the
novel solution {P̂⋆F ,W˜⋆P} is also feasible to problem (37) and may even realize a lower objective
value than {P˜⋆F ,W˜⋆P}. As a result, we conclude that the optimal P⋆F to problem (37) (equivalent
to the outage-constrained SRM problem (23)) must be of rank-1. Since the W˜P related KKT
conditions of problem (23) are also the same as that of problem (29), the proof for the rank-1
optimal W˜P to problem (29) in Appendix A can still be applied to problem (23). Due to space
limitation, the detailed proof is omitted here. Overall, the rank-1 optimal solution P˜⋆F ,W˜
⋆
P to
the outage-constrained SRM problem (23) is proved.
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APPENDIX D
Recalling the proof in Step 1 of Appendix A, for any fixed τ , we readily infer that the AN
aided problem (27) is equivalent to the following power minimization problem
min
τ,W˜P0,P˜F0,Σ˜U0
tr(P˜F )
s.t. A˜R1 : tr(Σ˜U) ≥ fA, A˜R2 : tr(C1hHR P˜FhR) ≥ C2, C˜R1, A˜R3, C˜R3, (43)
where fA denotes the optimal objective value of problem (27) and C2 = (1 − τ)(2
Rth
(1−τ) − 1).
To demonstrate the rank-1 optimal solution {W˜P , P˜F , Σ˜U} to problem (43), we formulate the
corresponding KKT conditions as
(1 + β⋆)INF + γ
⋆gpg
H
p − ψ⋆C1hRhHR − Z⋆F = 0, (44a)
(β⋆ − ρ⋆)INF + γ⋆gpgHp − Z⋆U = 0, (44b)
Z⋆U Σ˜
⋆
U = 0, (30b) ∼ (30f), (30h)|fη,τ=C2 , (44c)
where {ρ⋆, ψ⋆, β⋆}, λ⋆ and γ⋆ are the optimal lagrangian multipliers associated with constraints
A˜R1 ∼ A˜R3, C˜R1 and C˜R3, respectively, while Z⋆U  0 is the optimal lagrangian multiplier for
Σ˜U  0. It is readily observed from (44a) and (30c) that
rank
([
(1 + β⋆)INF + γ
⋆gPg
H
P
]
P˜⋆F
)
= rank(P˜⋆F ) = rank(ψ
⋆C1hRh
H
R P˜
⋆
F ) ≤ 1, (45)
which implies that the optimal P˜⋆F to problem (43) is of rank-1. Additionally, based on (44b) and
(44c), we also find that β⋆−ρ⋆ ≥ 0 for guaranteeing Z⋆U  0. To be specific, when β⋆−ρ⋆ = 0,
we have γ⋆gpg
H
p Σ˜
⋆
U = 0. Clearly, there must exist a rank-1 optimal Σ˜
⋆
U within the null space
of gHp . While for β
⋆ − ρ⋆ > 0, Z⋆U ≻ 0 and Σ˜⋆U = 0 are obtained according to (44c). Based
on above discussion, the rank-1 optimal Σ˜⋆U to problem (43) can be proved. Without loss of
generality, the W˜P related constraints of problem (43) are also identical to that of problem (29).
Therefore, the rank-1 nature of the optimal W˜⋆P to problem (43) can be verified. Considering
the equivalence between problems (43) and (27), we finally conclude that the optimal solution
{W˜P , P˜F , Σ˜U} of problem (27) is also of rank-1.
APPENDIX E
Since it has been proved that the globally optimal or high-quality suboptimal FBS information
covariance matrices PF for all studied problems, namely (5), (12), (18) and (26), are all of rank-
1, accordingly, we can define the optimal P⋆F = λPpFp
H
F with ‖pF‖F = 1 and λP > 0 for all
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these problems. Furthermore, by substituting P⋆F = λPpFp
H
F into the secrecy rate expression in
(4), it yields
RS = (1− τ) log2
(
1 + C1λPh
H
RpFp
H
F hR
)− (1− τ) log2 det (INE+REHEPFHHE )
= (1− τ) log2
(
1 +
C1|hHRpF |2 − ‖R
1
2
EHEpF‖2F
1
λP
+ ‖R
1
2
EHEpF‖2F
)
. (46)
Notice that our work aims to optimize PF for achieving the maximum non-negative secrecy
rate RS , so we must have C1|hHRpF |2 ≥ ‖R
1
2
EHEpF‖2F at the optimal P⋆F = λPpFpHF . Based
on this, it can be found from (46) that RS is a monotonically non-decreasing function of λP .
Additionally, when the cross-interference constraint CR3 is inactive for each problem, it is clear
that λP is only subject to the constraint CR2 for problems (5), (12), (18), or constraints AR2
and AR3 for problem (26). Based on (46) and problem (26), we readily infer that both CR2
and AR3 are active at the optimal P⋆F for maximizing secrecy rate RS and artificial noise
power, respectively. Inspired by this conclusion, we further formulate the common subproblem
for optimizing PB energy covariance matrices WP in different cases of FBS-EVE CSI with the
inactive CR3 as
max
τ,WP0
τξtr(HFWPH
H
F ), s.t. CR1: 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, tr(WP ) ≤ PP . (47)
According to [31, Lemma H.1.h], we readily derive the closed-form solutionW⋆P to problem
(47) as W⋆P = PPwPw
H
P with wP = νmax(H
H
FHF ).
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